however, all 3270s were half-duplex and if you were unfortunate to hit a >> > key same time system went to write to screen, it would lock the keyboard >> > and would have to stop and hit the reset key. YKT developed a FIFO box
for 3277, unplug the keyboard from the 3277 head, plug the FIFO box into >> > the head and plug the 3277 keyboard into the fifo box ... eliminating
the unfortunate keyboad lock.
This reminds me of something when I was a student around 1975. My university's
only computer was an IBM 360/44 and we could use some 2260 terminals. Digging through some manuals I got the idea that by munging the "carriage control character" from a Fortran program I might be able to break out of the restriction of block-mode operation and persuade a 2260 to do animated graphics.
When tried my proof-of-concept program I did get the terminal to keep redrawing a very flickery but changing few lines. But while I was watching this, the other users in the lab started complaining that their terminals were
frozen. Then the operators started running around trying to find out why
the whole mainframe had hung. It appeared that my hack had somehow elevated the priority of my animation such that nothing else was getting run at all.
I couldn't even interrupt my own program. They had to reboot the machine to fix it and I was told in no uncertain terms to never do that again!
In the end, I think they had to re-IPL the system and FORMAT the HASP
SPOOL disk to recover.
I was lucky to keep my job.
That was because the HASP job queue had about 100 slots, with a
pre-allocated cylinder for the input cards for the job and I think also
the log files. Once all the job queue slots were taken up by the BAD
jobs, no new jobs could be read in FROM ANYWHERE in the RJE network,
until a job slot had been finished and the slot made available for a new
job.
But it was worse. The OS/360 job card had a job ID field at the
beginning of the card (before the word JOB), and all the BAD jobs had
the same invalid ID. So when a job came in with a blank ID field, it was
a duplicate of the preceding BAD jobs; each new job had to be assigned a
unique new ID, and this generated a console message announcing a
duplicate ID, folowed by a console message announcing the new ID,
followed by a message that the new job had been placed in HOLD status,
so that only one of these jobs with the same ID could be in the OS job
queue. After the first duplicate, the newly generated ID was also a
duplicate, triggering more HASP console messages as the queue was
searched trying to find a new unique name. As each job finished, HASP
would release the jobs that had been HELD, triggering more messages.
Soon, the 1050 console was running 15 minutes behind, and the operator
was unable to get a command in.
In the end, I think they had to re-IPL the system and FORMAT the HASP
SPOOL disk to recover.
I was lucky to keep my job.
I think someone wrote a PTF for HASP to make sure that could not happen
again!
There were only so many WTO (console) buffers, too, so writing lots of
stuff to the console would also bog the system down.
[snip; great story]
On 2025-02-05, Peter Flass <peter_flass@yahoo.com> wrote:
There were only so many WTO (console) buffers, too, so writing lots of
stuff to the console would also bog the system down.
The more I have learned later, the more I understand just how bad it
was. It was an impressive denial-of-service attack for its time. As the
phone calls flew from the machine room operator to the operations
manager, to the head systems programmer, to the IBM field support, and
on and on, red faces of embarrassment must have triggered explosive
anger.
And like any other system vulnerability then or later, it was a simple
case of insufficient input validation. In retrospect, it was bound to
happen sooner or later. ;-)
The more I have learned later, the more I understand just how bad it
was. It was an impressive denial-of-service attack for its time. As the
phone calls flew from the machine room operator to the operations
manager, to the head systems programmer, to the IBM field support, and
on and on, red faces of embarrassment must have triggered explosive
anger.
The more I have learned later, the more I understand just how bad it
was. It was an impressive denial-of-service attack for its time. As the
phone calls flew from the machine room operator to the operations
manager, to the head systems programmer, to the IBM field support, and
on and on, red faces of embarrassment must have triggered explosive
anger.
And like any other system vulnerability then or later, it was a simple
case of insufficient input validation. In retrospect, it was bound to
happen sooner or later. ;-)
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